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COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND
HOLDS NO RES JUDICATA, NO DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, AND NO DUE PROCESS VIOLATION IN
STATE EMPLOYEE TERMINATION.
Maryland State Department of Education v. Douglas Shoop
Sama Shabib*
INTRODUCTION
On January 13, 1998, in Maryland State Department of
Education v. Douglas Shoop, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
reversed a decision of the Circuit Court, Washington County by holding
that: (1) res judicata did not preclude the Maryland State Department
of Education ("MSDE") from terminating one of its instructors based
on actions which previously resulted in a one-day suspension; (2) the
instructor's subsequent termination was not barred by double jeopardy;
and (3) the instructor's due process rights were not violated when he
had actual notice of the evidence that MSDE had against him.2 The
Court held that although there was a MSDE proceeding to suspend the
instructor, the proceeding was very informal and therefore did not
satisfy the threshold requirement that the "earlier proceeding [be] the
essential equivalent of a judicial proceeding" so that the doctrine of res
judicata applies.3 Furthermore, the Court held that double jeopardy,
which applies only when there are two punishments, did not bar the
instructor's second suspension and termination after he served an earlier
suspension; since, the earlier suspension was remedial in nature rather
than punitive.4 Finally, the court held that the instructor's due process
rights were not violated since he had actual notice that MSDE would
use an officer's investigatory report and would call him as a witness
when the report was released at a hearing regarding his suspension,
*Second year law student, Loyola University Chicago, School of Law.
2Maryland State Department of Education v. Shoop, 704 A.2d 499 (Md. App.
1998), cert denied, 349 Md. 495, 709A. 2d 140 (1998).31d. at 507 (citing Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191 (1992)).
41d. at 508, n..5.
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during pre-termination hearing discovery, and in pre-hearing
correspondence from MSDE's counsel.5
FACTS
Douglas Shoop was employed as an auto mechanics instructor
in MSDE's correctional educational program, Maryland Correctional
Training Center ("MCTC"), a Division of Correction ("DOC")
institution.6 As an auto mechanics instructor, Shoop was assigned to
teach vocational automotive mechanics to inmate students at MCTC
with the assistance of two inmates.7 In addition to training the inmates,
he was responsible for adhering to all safety and security regulations
mandated by the DOC, including the Tool Control Policy that was
issued by MCTC on April 7, 1993.8 The implementation and
interpretation of the Tool Control Procedures were the responsibility of
MCTC Tool Control Officer, Sergeant Craig Gregory. 9
On August 10 and 11, 1993, Sergeant Gregory commenced
inspections of Shoop's auto shop and found several violations of the
tool control policy involving unsupervised inmates in the tool crib area
of the shop.'" He warned Shoop of the violations and attempted to
discuss the occurrences with Shoop, only to receive belligerent
answers." Sergeant Gregory filed an incident report with the MCTC
warden and principal. 2 As a result of this report and a subsequent
explanation of the violations by Shoop, the Director of the Correctional
Education Program, John Linton, approved a recommendation that
51d. at 510.61d. at 501.
7 d. at 502.
"Id. The Tool Control Procedures required that (1) whenever a tool crib storage area
was opened, the instructor must be present, (2) instructors must be physically present in the
tool cribs during issue and receipt of tools, (3) inmates may be present in the tool cribs to assist
instructors, however, instructors must provide direct supervision and must personally account
for all tools issued and received, (4) instructors sign for all tools issued and received, (5) no
inmate was allowed to be left alone in the tool crib, (6) the tool crib was to be locked at all
times when the instructor was not in it.
Id.
'old at 503.
1 'Id.
'
2Id.
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Shoop be suspended for one day. 3 Shoop served the suspension on
August 17, 1993.'
4
MSDE closed the MCTC auto shop and re-assigned Shoop to
low-level clerical duties."5 Meanwhile, the principal of MCTC and
MCTC's Chief of Investigations, Lieutenant Robert Tichnell,
investigated tool control procedures in Shoop's auto shop. 6 After a
review of shop documents, the facility, interviews with Shoop's
students and aides, and an interview of Shoop by Director Linton,
Lieutenant Tichnell concluded that Shoop had "violated DOC standards
for personal conduct, control of tools, performance of duties, handling
of State property, reports and attitude toward inmates, and 'blatantly
disregarded the tool control policy."" 7 On August 22, 1993, MSDE's
warden informed Director Linton of the content of Tichnell's
investigatory report and requested that Shoop be barred from the
MCTC facility and that his employment be terminated. s
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
MSDE filed charges for removal of Shoop on October 14, 1993,
and suspended him without pay until the charges were resolved.'9 He
was sent a copy of the charges against him, an explanation of the
charges and suspension, and detailed descriptions of the August 10 and
11 incidents leading up to his suspension.20  Shoop appealed the
suspension pending charges for removal; however, the suspension was
upheld after MSDE presented evidence regarding the August 10 and 11
incidents, as well as the investigative report prepared by Lieutenant
Tichnell and the interview by Director Linton with Shoop.2'
Shoop also appealed his termination.2 2 MSDE gave Shoop
written notice of the witnesses it intended to call, including Lieutenant
131d
1Id
'
41d
Istd.
61d.
171d at 504.
181d
19Id
201d.
211d.
221d.
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Tichnell, and its document list, including Tichnell's investigative
report.' Shoop's counsel had the ability to inspect these documents on
or about June 6, 1994.24 As a result of the termination hearing, on June
13, 1994, the administrative agency found that Shoop's appeal had no
merit.25 After Shoop filed exceptions and after a January 24, 1995
exceptions hearing, his employment was terminated.26
Shoop filed an appeal to the circuit court." On August 31,
1995, the circuit court issued an opinion and order reversing the
termination.2' The circuit court held that collateral estoppel prohibited
MSDE from terminating Shoop for reasons which led to the one-day
suspension.29 The court also held that the termination was in error since
Shoop had not received adequate notice of the evidence MSDE
intended to use to support the termination.3 °
On August 21, 1995, just ten days before the trial court issued
its opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals issued a slip opinion with
facts nearly identical to those in Shoop.3 In Ward v. Dep't of Public
Safety, 663 A.2d 66 (1995), a DOC employee who had been suspended
then subsequently terminated based on the same violations had no
double jeopardy defense. The court stated that "because the discipline
is not imposed for the purpose of punishment, the principles of double
jeopardy simply do not apply. 32 In response to the Ward decision,
MSDE filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment and the court
subsequently held a hearing on November 21, 1995.ss
On March 5, 1997, the circuit court issued another opinion and
order again reversing Shoop's termination.34 This time, however, the
court's reversal was based on the finding that res judicata, not collateral
estoppel, prohibited Shoop's removal based on the August 10 and 11
231d
241d.
25ld.
2761d.
21d. at 505.
291d
301d. at 509.
11d. at 505.
12Ward, 663 A.2d at 69.
"Shoop, 704 A. 2d 505.341d.
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violations.35 Specifically, the court stated that "[Shoop] should not be
required to repeatedly defend against suits based on the same cause of
action."36 MSDE subsequently filed a timely appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland."
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND
DECISION
Internal MSDE proceeding are informal in nature and not
the equivalent of judicial proceedings; therefore, Shoop has
no res judicata defense to his termination.
The Court agreed with MSDE's assertion that the circuit court
erred when it reversed Shoop's termination based on res judicata.3" In
so doing, the Court had to determine whether the earlier proceeding by
the administrative agency embraced "elements of adjudicatory
procedure consistent with established principles of due process" and;
consequently, whether it was similar to a judicial proceeding.39
The Court determined that MSDE was not acting within a
"judicial capacity" when it suspended Shoop since MSDE proceedings
are very informal.40 In support of this determination, the Court noted
the informal process that lead up to Shoop's suspension.4 Specifically,
it found that the principal of MSDE requested that Shoop be given a
one-day suspension after he had received Sergeant Gregory's initial
incident report concerning the August 10 and 11 inspections and
discovered violations.42 In response to the principal's request, the
Director of the Human Resource Management Branch notified Shoop
of his one-day suspension and that it was approved to occur on August
17, 1993. 43 Moreover, the Court noted that at the time of the
331d. at 507.
361d. at 505.
37Id.
381d. at 507.
39 1d.
401d.
4 1Id.
4 2
Jd.
43Id.
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infractions, State regulations only required that agency representatives
hold a conference with the agency employee in order to determine the
merit of the grievance in question. 4 These required hearings were not
conducted by judicial officers.45 Instead, they were conducted by
Assistant Superintendents of Schools who were not trained in civil
procedure, who did not record the proceeding, and who did not
recognize rules of evidence or trial procedure." In fact, the Court noted
that the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH") heard appeals from
the MSDE de novo and were required to give no deference to the
internal grievance fact-finding. 47
Although the Court found that some administrative appeals can
have a res judicata effect, they did not find that the decision to suspend
Shoop, or Shoop's subsequent appeal of that decision barred later
proceedings to terminate him, especially since there were subsequent
findings that indicated the initial infractions were more common and
more serious than originally thought. 4' Therefore, the Court was not
persuaded, as was the circuit court, that double jeopardy applied
because of Shoop's ability to call witnesses, introduce exhibits, and be
represented by counsel at the internal grievance hearing.49
Consequently, the initial informal hearing to suspend Shoop had no res
judicata affect.5"
The Division of Correction's disciplinary sanctions imposed
on Shoop were remedial in nature; therefore, he does not
have a double jeopardy defense to his termination.
Related to the issue of the non-applicability of res judicata to
Shoop's case, the Court again cited the Ward case to support its finding
that Shoop had no double jeopardy defense to his termination.5 In a
"Id. (citing Code of Maryland Regulations ("COMAR") 06.01, 01.56(C) (1993)).
4 Shoop, 704 A. 2d 508.461d.
471d.
48Id
491d.
301d.
I11d. Shoop did not raise an administrative double jeopardy defense as such;
however, the Court of Special Appeals also did a double jeopardy analysis.
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footnote to its opinion, the Court noted that the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
against multiple prosecutions as well as multiple punishments.52
Therefore, the relevant inquiry under this issue is "whether a given civil
sanction constitutes punishment."53 The Court stated that if the purpose
of the penalty is retribution or deterrence, then it suffices as a
punishment.' However, if the purpose of the penalty is remedial, then
it is not punishment."
In the Ward case, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that a
correctional officer's suspensions based on four infractions (such as not
reporting to work) and subsequent removal charges based on the same
four infractions were not in violation of the double jeopardy clause
since the suspensions were remedial in nature rather than for the
purpose of punishment.56 Additionally, the Ward Court found that the
DOC imposes its method of discipline to assure that employees adhere
to standards of conduct.57 In addition to Ward, the Shoop Court also
cited another Maryland Court of Appeals decisions where they held that
termination imposed by the DOC is not intended as punishment for
purposes of double jeopardy, but as protection to the public.58
In support of its conclusion that Shoop's sanctions were
remedial in nature rather than punitive, the Court stated that MSDE had
numerous reasons to terminate Shoop's employment even after the first
suspension.59 For example, other correctional officers testified that they
would be uncomfortable working with Shoop as an inmate supervisor
and that they were concerned that working with him would increase
their workload and their levels of fear." Additionally, Shoop himself
urged the Court to consider an issue raised by the trial court.6 At that
time, it was noted that the first disciplinary suspension was remedial in
nature while the termination was clearly intended as punishment since
521d. at 508 n.5.
"sId. (citing Ward, 663 A.2d at 69).
341d.
"Id.
56Ward, 663 A.2d at 69-71.
"Id. at 69.
"Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Andresen, 379 A.2d 159 (1977).
"'Shoop, 704 A.2d at 509.
601d. at 509-10.
611d. at 510.
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the necessary remedial effects were satisfied by the initial suspension. 62
In response to that argument, the Court simply stated that Shoop's
position lacks merit since he admits that the first suspension was
remedial rather than punitive.63 Therefore, whether the subsequent
suspension or termination was punitive has no effect and double
jeopardy ceases to be a possible defense.'
In Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), the United
States Supreme Court's analysis of whether a double jeopardy defense
existed differed from the Shoop Court's analysis. In Hudson, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") assessed monetary
penalties against three individuals who held positions as officers and/or
directors in a bank and who used their positions to arrange a series of
loans to the benefit of third parties in violation of 12 USC §§84 and
375b.65 The Government subsequently criminally indicted the
petitioners based on essentially the same conduct." The Supreme
Court rejected the petitioners' double jeopardy defense.67 In so doing,
the Court found that for double jeopardy analysis, the threshold inquiry
is not whether the two sanctions were punitive, but rather whether they
were both criminal.68
The Hudson Court asserted that the double jeopardy clause is
violated only when two criminal punishments are administered for the
same offense and that it was not violated in this case when one civil
punishment was followed by a criminal punishment. 69 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the initial, civil monetary penalty and the later
criminal sanction assessed by the OCC did not violate the double
jeopardy clause.7'
62Id
631d
"
"Id.
6 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 97.
66Id.
671d. at 95.68d.
69d. at 104.
7od. at 95.
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Shoop had actual notice of the evidence MSDE intended to
use against him; therefore his due process rights were not
violated.
The Court agreed with the MSDE's assertion that the circuit
court erred when it reversed Shoop's termination on the grounds that he
had not received adequate notice of the evidence that MSDE intended
to use against him in support of the charges for removal at the
termination hearing.7 Before reaching this conclusion, the Court
questioned whether Shoop received notice as required by MSDE's
resolution.' It determined that for due process purposes, this
requirement may be satisfied by proof that Shoop had actual notice."
Actual notice, the Court stated, can occur when a prudent man is put
"upon inquiry as to a particular fact, and who omits to make such an
inquiry, with reasonable diligence."'74
In this case, the Court found that Shoop had received actual
notice of the evidence that MSDE planned to present against him at the
termination hearing so that his due process rights were not violated.75
First, Shoop received notice that MSDE intended to use Lieutenant
Tichnell's investigation report during his interview with Director
Linton.76 Secondthe report "was released at the October 1993 hearing
regarding his suspension pending charges for removal, during pre-
termination hearing discovery, and in pre-hearing correspondence from
MSDE's counsel."77 Additionally, the pre-hearing correspondence
specifically listed the investigation report as an exhibit that MSDE
would introduce into evidence and that MSDE would call the author of
the report, Lieutenant Tichnell, as a witness.78 Consequently, since the
"Shoop, 704 A.2d at 510.
ld (citing MSDE RESOLUTION 1983-46 which provides in pertinent part that the
State Superintendent must file charges for removal which shall state the cause of action.
Additionally, the resolution provides that the affected employee must be informed of the right
to a hearing and that MSDE bears the burden of establishing the legitimacy of the cause of
action by a preponderance of the evidence).
"Shoop, 704 A. 2d 510. (citing State v. Barnes 328 A.2d 737 (1974)).
'
4Shoop, 704 A.2d 510. (citing Baltimore v. Perticone, 188 A. 797 (1937)).
"Id.
761d.
771d.
71d.
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Court determined that Shoop had actual notice of MSDE's above
intentions, it held that the circuit court erred in finding a due process
violation."
CONCLUSION
This decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
concerning res judicata affirms the long-standing principle that only
when an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and
properly resolves disputed issues of fact before it, will the courts apply
res judicata to enforce repose." However, the Shoop Court's double
jeopardy analysis must be called into question considering the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Hudson.8 In light of the Hudson
decision, it seems that the Shoop Court should not have focused on
whether Shoop's suspension and subsequent termination were remedial
or punitive, but, rather, whether they were civil or criminal.8 2
While this discrepancy regarding the proper test for double
jeopardy is important to note, the outcome in Shoop probably would not
have differed had the Court used the Hudson analysis. Shoop's
suspension and subsequent termination can not be categorized as
criminal. The suspension and termination were imposed as a result of
Shoop's violations of MCTC's internal Tool Control Policies, Shoop,
704 A.2d at 504, and not as a result of a violation of a criminal statute
as was the case in Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96. Therefore, while another
court may invalidate the double jeopardy analysis articulated in Shoop,
it would likely concur in the ultimate judgment rendered by the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland.
791d
3Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991);
United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
"Hudson, 522 U.S. 93.
S2Shoop, 704 A.2d at 509.
